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Judicial Treatment of Parental
Cohabitation after Jarrettv. Jarrett
INTRODUCTION

Census Bureau statistics indicate that from 1960 to 1970, the
incidence of nonmarital cohabitation in the United States increased 700%.1 Since 1970, the number of persons cohabiting has
risen an additional 100%.2 As the parallel climb in the divorce

rate continues, it is estimated that over 30% of all children will
experience a parental divorce. 3 These figures reflect a dramatic
change in society's attitude toward traditional notions of marriage and child-rearing. This change of attitude, however, has
not been accepted by all sectors of society. As competing societal
values and attitudes toward cohabitation continue to surface, the
legal system often serves as the battleground for determining the
legal consequences which attach to nonmarital relationships.4

1.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE,

1970

CENSUS OF THE POPULATION,

PERSONS By FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, Table 11, at 4B; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPr
OF COMMERCE,

1960

CENSUS OF POPULATION, PERSONS By FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS,

Table

15, at 4B.
2. From 1970 to 1978 the number of unmarried couples living together increased 117%
from 523,000 households in 1970 to 1.1 million in 1978. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPTr
OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, SERIES P.20, No. 349, MARITAL STATUS AND
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS (March 1950). See also M. KING, COHABITATION HANDBOOK 2
(1975).
3. The divorce rate rose from 2.2 per thousand in 1960 to 5.1 per thousand in 1978.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE (PHS 79-1103), VITAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S., VOL III, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 2-5
(1979); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP-t OF COMMERCE, SERIES P.23, No. 84, DIVORCE,
CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT 2 (1979). Government estimates indicate that if the

divorce trend continues, 40% of all marriages will end in divorce. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, SERIES P.23, No. 84, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT 2 (1979).
4. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior; Sanctions on Non-Marital
Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 275, 276. The California Supreme Court, in Marvin v.
Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), addressed the issue of the
remedies that may be available to a nonmarital party after the nonmarital relationship
has ended. Based upon a recognition of the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in
society and the social acceptance of them, the court recognized that a change in judicial
attitude toward cohabitation was warranted. Accordingly, the court concluded that a
cause of action for damages can be predicated upon an express oral contract, implied
contract, constructive trust, or quasi-contract.
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In the area of child custody, the judiciary has had to consider
whether cohabitation by a custodial parent5 so adversely affects
the child as to justify a change in the original custody decree.
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed this issue in Jarrettv. Jarrett.6 The court held that a transfer of custody from a cohabiting

parent to a non-cohabiting parent was justified on the grounds
that the cohabiting parent's lifestyle threatened the children's
7
moral well-being.
Following Jarrett,the Illinois Appellate Court has developed a
variety of distinctions and exceptions to avoid the force of the
Jarrett decision. This has produced a number of approaches to
the treatment of cohabitation in custody proceedings. 8 As a
result, there are no consistent guidelines for the Illinois courts to
follow when presented with this issue.
This note will focus on cohabitation as a factor in custody
determinations. First, it will set forth the current standards used
in Illinois custody proceedings. Second, the Jarrettdecision and
the various responses to Jarrettby the Illinois Appellate Court
will be discussed. Third, the conclusive presumption established
by Jarrettwill be analyzed and the reasons why it should be
rejected set forth. In addition, the current posture of the Illinois
courts concerning this issue will be discussed. Finally, recommendations will be proposed for use by the courts in custody proceedings involving a cohabiting parent.

The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of Marvin in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill.
2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). The Hewitt court criticized the Marvin rationale that
changes in societal values required a parallel change in the law relating to marriage. As
a result, it refused to confer legal status on the cohabitational relationship. See generally
Note, Beyond Marvin:A Proposalfor Quasi-SpousalSupport, 30 STAN. L REv. 359 (1978).
5. 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927, reh'g denied, 449
U.S. 1067 (1980).
6. Id. at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 423.
7. Of the 12 post-Jarrettcases decided in Illinois, only two have held that cohabitation
warrants modification of custody. See Krabel v. Krabel, 102 111. App. 3d 251, 429 N.E.2d
1105 (1981); In re Custody of Iverson, 83 Ill. App. 3d 493, 404 N.E.2d 411 (1980). But see
Thompson v. Thompson, 96 Ill. 2d 40, 449 N.E.2d 94 (1983); In re Marriage of Hanson,
112 Ill. App. 3d 564, 445 N.E.2d 912 (1983); In re Marriage of Olsen, 98 Ill. App. 3d 316,
424 N.E.2d 386 (1981); Brandt v. Brandt, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 425 N.E.2d 1251 (1981); In re
Custody of Nodot, 81111. App. 3d 883, 401 N.E.2d 1189 (1980); Willcutts v. Willcutts, 88 111.
App. 3d 813, 410 N.E.2d 1057 (1980); In re Marriage of Burgham, 86 Il. App. 3d 341, 408
N.E.2d 37 (1980); Applegate v. Applegate, 80 Ill. App. 3d 81, 399 N.E.2d 330 (1980); In re
Custody of Boyer, 83 Ill. App. 3d 52, 403 N.E.2d 796 (1980); In re Custody of Blonsky, 84
ll. App. 3d 810, 405 N.E.2d 1112 (1980).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 106-37.
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Jarrett v. Jarrett
BACKGROUND

The Best Interests Standards
Judicial Treatment
The current standard 9 for the resolution of custody disputes is
the "best interest of the child."' 10 The goal of the best interest
standard is to place the child in the environment which will pro-

9. At common law, the adjudication of custody disputes was governed by the simple
rule that the father was "the person entitled by law to the custody of his child." King v.
DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054, 1055 (1804) (Lord Ellenborough speaking). This absolute right of the father arose from his legal obligation to support his child. In addition, it
was an outgrowth of the prevailing view of children as chattel. See 1. W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *447-454. Custody law in the first half of the twentieth century witnessed
a complete reversal from the common law paternal preference to an equally rigid preference for the mother. The mother of a young child was automatically given custody unless
she was found to be unfit. See Jones, Tender Years Doctrine: Survey and Analysis, 16 J.
FAM. L. 695 (1978); Roth, Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J.FAM.
L. 423 (1977); Note, Maternal Preference and the Double Burden: Best Interestof Whom?,
38 LA. L.REV. 1096 (1978).
For an in-depth discussion of the development of standards employed in custody proceedings, see generally Schiller, Child Custody: Evolution of Current Criteria,26 DE PAUL
L. REV.241 (1977); Shepard, Soloman's Sword: Adjudication of Child Custody Questions,
8 U. RICH. L. REV. 151 (1974).
10. This standard was first enunciated by Justice Brewer in Chapsky v. Wood, 26
Kan. 650 (1881) and later by Justice Cardozo in Finaly v. Finaly, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E.
624 (1926). "The Chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction upon petition does not proceed
upon the theory that the petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action
against the other or indeed against anyone. He acts as parenspatriaeto do what is best
for the interest of the child." Id. at 433, 148 N.E. at 626.
The majority of states use the best interest standard or some equivalent. See ALA.CODE
§ 30-3-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (1983);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1211 (1979); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983); COLO.REV. STAT,
§ 14-10-124 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722
(1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT,
§ 571-45 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
602 (1981);
IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-31 (West 1983); IOWA CODE § 598.41 (West 1982); Ky. REV. STAT,
§ 403.270 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West 1984); MINN. STAT.
§ 518.17 (1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-40-214 (1981);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (1974); N.J. REV. STAT.

§ 9:2-4 (1976); N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 240 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13-2
(1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A) (Page
Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1277 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 109,030 (1977); PA.STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 1004 (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 30-27-19 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-823 (1983); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN,

§ 3.55 (Vernon 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 652 (1983); VA. CODE § 20-107.2 (Supp.
1982); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.190 (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 48-10-2 (1980); WIS. STAT.
§ 767.24 (1979); WYo. STAT. § 20-2-113 (1979).
The states that employ the best interest standard by case law include Georgia, Kansas,

340

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

vide optimal physical, intellectual, mental, and spiritual growth. 1
As the name implies, the best interest standard requires the
court to keep the child's welfare as the "guiding star" 12 in original custody hearings and any subsequent modifications of the
13
custody decree.
To determine which environment will best serve the child's
interests, courts carefully assess and balance a wide range of
factors. The two factors which have received the most attention
from courts and commentators are the child's age 14 and the
child's preference for the parent with whom he or she would
prefer to live.' 5 Courts are also concerned with factors such as

Maine, Maryland, Mississippi and Rhode Island. See Frether v. Frether, 243 Ga. 763, 256
S.E.2d 446 (1970); Moudy v. Moudy, 211 Kan. 213, 505 P.2d 766 (1973); Grover v. Grover,
143 Me. 34, 54 A.2d 753 (1963); Chilenni v. Chilenni, 197 Md. 257, 78 A.2d 715 (Ct. App.
1951); Neal v. Neal, 238 Miss. 572, 119 So.2d 273 (1960); Calcagno v. Calcagno, 391 A.2d
99 (R.I. 1978).
11. Taylor, Child Custody Problems in Illinois, 24 DE PAUL L REV. 521, 521 (1975).
12. Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952). The court enunciated the best
interests standard, stating that, "[tihe guiding star is and must be, at all times, the best
interest of the child." Id. at 415, 105 N.E.2d at 304. See also In re Marriage of Leopando,
106 Ill. App. 3d 444, 435 N.E.2d 1312 (1982) (primary consideration in a child custody case
is the best interests of the child); In re Marriage of Ramer, 84 Ill.
App. 3d, 405 N.E.2d 401
(1980) (welfare and best interest of child is sole objective-of court in making child custody

determination).
13. Two years after the initial decree, the non-custodial parent may petition the court
for a modification of the original decree, if there is sufficient cause and if modification is
in the child's best interest. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40, 1 610(1) (1981) (court has jurisdiction to
decide custody in original and modification proceedings). See infra note 39 for text of
modification statute.
14. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Kennedy, 94 Ill.
App. 3d 537, 418 N.E.2d 947 (1981); In
re Custody of Switalla, 87 Ill.
App. 3d 168,408 N.E.2d 1139 (1980).
15. See, e.g., In re Marriage of McCune, 86 Ill.
App. 3d 311, 408 N.E.2d 319 (1980); In
re Marriage of Lovejoy, 84 Ill.
App. 3d 53, 404 N.E.2d 1092 (1980). The child's preference
in selecting his or her custodian has been the subject of much comment. See generally
Speca, Role of Child in Selecting His or Her Custodian in Divorce Cases, 27 DRAKE L
REV. 437 (1978); Whelan, Wishes of Children and the Role of the SeparateRepresentative,
5 MONASH U. L. REV. 287 (1979).

Although the child's preference as to which parent he or she would rather live with is
an important factor in custody determinations, the preference is not controlling. See In re
Marriage of Kush, 106 Ill. App. 3d 233, 435 N.E.2d 921 (1982) (preference of child as to
custody, though entitled to consideration, is not binding upon the courts); In re Marriage
of Allen, 81 Ill.
App. 3d 517, 401 N.E.2d 608 (1980) (the trial court is not precluded from
finding that the child's preference is not in the child's best interest).
State statutes and case law vary as to the admissibility of the child's preference and
the weight such evidence should be given. Some statutes are patterned after the UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197 (1974) [hereinafter cited as UMDA],

which regards the child's preference as one of the factors courts are to consider in custody
determinations. See infra note 35. Other states will consider the child's preference if that
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the frequency with which the parent will be away from the
home,' 6 the amount of discipline the child will receive, 17 the
physical and mental condition of the parents,18 parental conduct
which will affect the child, 19 the stability of the environment,2 °
abandonment and desertion of the spouse or child, 2 1 parental
alcoholism, 22 nonmarital sexual conduct, 23 and parental political philosophy. 24 Courts will also consider differences between
the parents' religious beliefs and practices, 25 in addition to their
ability to provide financially for the child's educational and

child has reached a certain chronological age. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 30-127(2971) (1978) (a
child over 14 can select the parent with whom he desires to live); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.04 (A) (Page Supp. 1983) (child over 12 has right to choose parent). Most states will
consider the child's preference if the child is of sufficient mental capacity to make an
informed and intelligent choice. See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983).
In addition to the child's capacity to choose, a court will consider the child's preference
only if the child's reasons for preferring one parent over the other are valid. For example,
a court will give less weight to a child's preference which was the product of parental
influences. See Filipello v. Filipello, 130 Ill. App. 2d 1089, 268 N.E.2d 478 (1971) (the basis
for the child's preference affects the weight that preference is given).
Although it is generally recognized that the child's preference is a factor in original
decrees, the jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether a change in the child's preference is sufficient to warrant a modification of the original custody decree. See Finn v.
Finn, 11 Ill. App. 3d 385, 297 N.E.2d 1 (1973) (preference of child is not decisive in custody
question and is not appropriate basis for modifying custodial provisions in divorce
decree). But see Dailey v. Dailey, 146 Ohio St. 93, 64 N.E.2d 246 (1945) (a child's preference for the parent who does not presently have custody and who would not be disqualified by unfitness would be a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification).
16. See, e.g., Patton v. Armstrong, 16 Ill. App. 3d 881,307 N.E.2d 178 (1974); Wilner v.
Wilner, 131 Ill. App. 2d 891, 266 N.E.2d 918 (1971).
17. See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 40 Ill. App. 3d 348, 352 N.E.2d 404 (1976) (failure of
father to discipline minor daughter's sexual misconduct).
18. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rizzo, 95 Ill. App. 3d 636, 420 N.E.2d 555 (1981); In re
Marriage of Ford, 91 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 415 N.E.2d 546 (1980).
19. See, e.g., In re Custody of Williams, 104 Ill. App. 3d 16, 432 N.E.2d 375 (1982);
Hinton v. Searles, 53 Ill. App. 3d 433,368 N.E.2d 937 (1977).
20. See, e.g., In re Custody of Potts, 83 Ill. App. 3d 518, 404 N.E.2d 446 (1980); Wurm v.
Howard, 82 111. App. 3d 116, 402 N.E.2d 407 (1980).
21. See, e.g., Soldner v. Soldner, 69 Ill. App. 3d 97, 386 N.E.2d 1153 (1979); Fears v.
Fears, 5 Ill. App. 3d 610, 283 N.E.2d 709 (1972).
22. See, e.g., Patterson v. Patterson, 47 Ill. App. 2d 133,197 N.E.2d 724 (1964).
23. See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 927, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); In re Marriage of Combs, 78 Ill. App. 3d 533,
397 N.E.2d 255 (1979).
24. See, e.g., Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 22 Ill. App. 3d 479, 317 N.E.2d 681
(1974) (custody properly awarded to father because of mother's unconventional views).
25. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ford, 91 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 415 N.E.2d 546 (1980);
Blonsky v. Blonsky, 84 Ill. App. 3d 810, 405 N.E.2d 1112 (1980). See generally Mangrum,
Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May Be Unconstitutional:Religion as a Factorin
Child Custody, 15 CREIGHTON L REV. 25 (1981).
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26
other needs.

The determination of what is in the best interests of the child
is the function of the trial court.27 The court enjoys wide discretion when deciding initial custody cases and subsequent modifications. 28 This broad discretion exists because the trial court is
in a more favorable position than the appellate court to observe
the parties, hear testimony, and examine evidence. 29 Such discretion will not be disturbed unless the decision is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. 3° Theoretically, this discretion
is not unbridled. In practice, however, this broad discretion often
allows the trial judge to decide cases based upon his own biases,
morals, and interests, rather than upon well reasoned principles
and articulable facts. 3'

26. See, e.g., In re Custody of Piccirilli, 88 Ill. App. 3d 621, 410 N.E.2d 1086 (1980);
Hursh v. Hursh, 26 Ill. App. 3d 947, 326 N.E.2d 95 (1975). See generally Podell and Peck,

First Custody- To Which Parent?,56 MARQ. L. REV. 51 (1972); Note, The Best Interestsof
the Child in Custody ControversiesBetween Natural Parents:Interpretationsand Trends,
18 WASHBuRN LJ. 482 (1979).

27. "Courts perform two very different functions in the resolution of custody disputes:
private-dispute settlement and child-protection." Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication:
JudicialFunctionsin the Face Indeterminacy,39 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 226, 229 (1975).
Both functions are performed simultaneously at the initial custody proceeding. At this
stage, the court seeks to protect the child's welfare by evaluating all relevant factors and
resolving the dispute over which parent will provide the optimal environment for the
child. See, e.g., Frees v. Frees, 99 Ill. App. 2d 213, 240 N.E.2d 274 (1968). The privatedispute role ceases upon entry of the order awarding custody to one of the parents. The
child-protection role, however, remains vital and is exercised through the court's continuing jurisdiction over the child.
28. See, e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 97 Ill. App. 3d 921, 424 N.E.2d 81 (1981) (great discretion is vested in the trial court in custody cases); In re Marriage of Mitchell, 103 Ill. App.
3d 242, 430 N.E.2d 716 (1981) (trial court has broad discretion in awarding custody and
there is a strong and compelling presumption in favor of its decision); In re Custody of
Piccirilli, 88 Ill. App. 3d 621, 410 N.E.2d 1086 (1980) (trial court is vested with great discretion in custody cases).
29. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ramer, 84 Ill. App. 3d 213, 405 N.E.2d 401 (1980) (custody matters are within the sound discretion of trial court because it is in the best position to hear and evaluate evidence). See generally Oster, Custody Proceeding:A Study of
Vague and Indefinite Standards,5 J. FAM. L 21, 23-25 (1965).
30. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Leopando, 106 Ill. App. 3d 444, 435 N.E.2d 1312 (1982)
(In awarding custody of a child, the trial court has broad discretion, but such discretion is
not unlimited. It is subject to review and when award is contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence, it is the duty of a reviewing court to reverse.); Lloyd v. Lloyd, 92 Ill. App.
3d 124, 415 N.E.2d 1105 (1980) (trial court's discretion in a custody proceeding will be
reversed only if court has clearly abused its discretion or its decision was contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence).
31. See Note, Modification of Child Custody Awards in Indiana: The Need for Statutory Guidelines, 47 IND. L.J. 129, 136 (1971); Comment, Child Custody: Best Interests of
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Statutory Treatment

In response to concerns about the potential for abuse of discretion at the trial court level, many jurisdictions have enacted
statutory schemes which provide substantive guidelines for the
courts to follow in custody cases. 32 In 1977, 33 the Illinois General
Assembly responded to this concern with the enactment of the
34
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act ("IMDMA").
The IMDMA closely follows the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act ("UMDA")35 in substance and purpose by delineating minimum factors which the court must consider in determining

Children vs. ConstitutionalRights of Parents,81 DICK. L. REV. 733, 736 (1977) (the author
views the best interests standard as a means to infiltrate constitutionally protected areas
of the family's private lives); Comment, Modifying Child Custody Awards: A Substantial
Change Under the Illinois Marriageand Dissolutionof MarriageAct, 1980 So. ILL U. L.J.
439, 441 [hereinafter cited as Modifying Child Custody Awards].
32. See Fain, Our Custody Laws and Policies-Are They in Need of Revision or
Change? [1963 proceedings] ABA Family Law Section 27, 29; Modifying Child Custody
Awards, supra note 31, at 441.
33. The former Illinois Divorce Act did not delineate the factors which the courts were
to consider. It simply provided: "[T]he court shall make inquiry with respect to the children of the parties, if any, and shall make such order touching the care, custody, support
and education of the minor children of the parties or any of them, as shall be deemed
proper and for the benefit of the children." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 19 (1975) (repealed
1977).
34. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40
101610 (1981) [hereinafter cited as IMDMA]. In interpreting the IMDMA, the Illinois courts
have relied extensively on the Commissioner's Comments to the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act. See, e.g., In re Custody of Sexton, 84 Ill. 2d 312, 418 N.E.2d 729 (1981) (interpreting 610(a) of IMDMA); In re Custody of Harne, 77 Ill. 2d 414, 396 N.E.2d 499 (1979)
(interpreting
610(b) of IMDMA); In re Custody of Burnett, 75 Ill. App. 3d 998, 394
N.E.2d 58 (1979) (interpreting
610(b)(1)-(2) of IMDMA). See generally Comment, The
Child Custody Provisions of the Illinois Marriageand Dissolution of Marriage Act, 56
CHI. KENT L. REV. 671 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Child Custody Provisions];Modifying
Child Custody Awards, supra note 31.
35. Illinois is among the many states that have patterned their statutes after the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197 (1974). Section 602 of the IMDMA
provides:
Sec. 602. Best interest of child.
(a) The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and inter-relationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and community;
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; and
(6) the physical violence or threat of violence by the child's potential custodian, whether directed against the child or directed against another

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

initial custody and in subsequent modification proceedings.
Section 602 of the IMDMA governs initial custody hearings.
The factors set forth in this section represent a compilation of
those criteria which courts have traditionally employed.3 6 These
factors include the wishes of the parent and child, the interaction
of the child with his siblings, the child's adjustment to his current environment, and the mental and physical health of the
proposed guardian. This list is not exhaustive.3 7 The court is
further directed to consider any relevant factors that may affect
the child's welfare.3 8 The statute does not set forth the relative
weight each factor must be given. Balancing and weighing these
factors is within the discretion of the trial court.
Section 61039 of the IMDMA governs any subsequent modifi-

person but witnessed by the child.
(b) The court shall not consider conduct of a present or proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 602 (1981). A number of other states have patterned their statutes after the UMDA. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (1983); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-10-124 (Supp. 1980); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911
(1981); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.40, 602 (1981); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 13-1-11.5-21 (West Supp. 1983); KY. REV. STAT. § 430.270 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT.
§ 518.17 (1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452-375 (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-214 (1981); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 652 (1983); VA. CODE § 20-107.2 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.190 (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 48-10-1 (1980); Wis. STAT. § 767.24 (1979). See
generally Callow, Custody of the Child and the Uniform Marriageand Divorce Act, 18
S.D.L. REV. 551 (1973); Levy, Introduction to Symposium on the Uniform Marriageand
Divorce Act, 18 S.D.L. REV. 531 (1973).
36. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 602 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (Historical and Practice Notes)
("This section codifies prior Illinois case law, which uniformly regarded the 'best interest'
standard as the fundamental principle of custody determination.").
37. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 602(a) (Smith-Hurd 1979) (Historical and Practice Notes)
602(a) are "non-exclusive." This same principle
explains that the six factors listed in
was stated in the comments to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: "The language of
the section makes it clear that the judge need not be limited to the factors specified."
UMDA, § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197 (1974) (Commissioners' Note).
38. See supra note 35.
39. Section 610 of the IMDMA provides:
Sec. 610. Modification.
(a) No motion to modify a custody judgment may be made earlier than 2 years
after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of affidavits
that there is reason to believe the child's present environment may endanger
seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health.
(b) The court shall not modify a prior custody judgment unless it finds, upon the
basis of facts that have arisen since the prior judgment or that were unknown
to the court at the time of entry of the prior judgment, that a change has
occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In applying these
standards the court shall retain the custodian appointed pursuant to the prior
judgment unless:
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cations of the initial custody decree.4 0 The primary aim of section 610 is the maintenance of finality of the original custody
order. 4 ' This goal is consistent with the current theories of human
development which recognize that the child's best interests can
only be served if stability and continuity are present in the
child's environment. 42 In furtherance of this goal, no modification may be brought within two years of the entry of the original
decree. 4 3 In addition, custody will be maintained in the present
custodian unless: the custodian agrees to a change; the child has
been integrated into the family of the petitioning parent; or the
petitioning parent can prove that the child's present environment is dangerous to his physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health and that the risks of harm from a change of environment
I

(1) the custodian agrees to the modification;
(2) the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with
consent of the custodian; or
(3) the child's present environment endangers seriously his physical,
mental, moral or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a
change of environment is outweighed by its advantages to him.
(c) Attorney fees and cost shall be assessed against the party seeking modification if the court finds that the modification action is vextious and constitutes
harassment.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch.40, 610 (1981).
40. The standards set forth in
610 of the IMDMA are substantially those upon
which Illinois courts have relied in custody modification proceedings. Generally, there
must have been a change in circumstances since the original determination and this
change must adversely affect the interests of the child. See Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 416,
105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952).
41. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
602-610 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (Historical and Practice
Notes) ("This section emphasizes stability and continuity in the child's environment.").
See In re Custody of Potts, 83 Ill. App. 3d 518, 404 N.E.2d 446 (1980) ("[Niothing is more
injurious to the child than to be shuttled between parents."); In re Custody of Russell, 80
Ill. App. 3d 41, 399 N.E.2d 212 (1979) (custody transferred to the father where the mother
moved five times in four months and her marital status and child care plans were
unsettled). See Modifying Child Custody Awards, supranote 31, at 450.
42. UMDA, § 409, 9A U.L.A. 212 (1974) (Commissioners' Note). See Watson, The
Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV.
55 (1969). See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (1973). The authors of this book stress the child's need for continuity in relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence and suggest that child placement
should be as final as possible. Id. at 31, 35.
43. The two year waiting period is not an absolute rule. Within the two year period, a
petitioner may be allowed a hearing on the issue of modification if he can show, by
affidavit, that there is some great urgency for the change and that the child's best interests require it. The trial judge will deny the motion to modify, without a hearing, if the
moving party has not carried the onerous burden of showing that the child's present
environment may endanger his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. UMDA
Commissioners' Note § 409.
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are outweighed by the advantage of a change of custody. 4
Practical application of the best interests standard is fraught
with difficulties. This is due, in part, to the nature of custody law.
Family law, and specifically the area of custody, has been described as vague and amorphous. 45 As one jurist has explained:
"[A] judge agonizes more about reaching the right result in a
contested custody issue than about any other type of decision he
renders." 46 The primary difficulty facing a court is the uncertainty
that characterizes any attempt to determine what is or is not in
the best interests of the child.
47
What is "best" for the child is indeterminate and speculative.
It is impossible to predict with exactitude what future external
48
events will occur in a child's life to mold and shape his future.
Additionally, little unanimity exists in the mental health profession regarding the theories of human development and the rela-

44. Under ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40,
610(b) (1981), the requirement that one of the three
factors just discussed be present before a court will order modification is a stricter standard than under the previous statute, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40, 19 (1975) (repealed 1977).
The previous statute merely required a showing that there were altered conditions or new
facts since the decree or that there existed material facts which were unknown to the
court at the time of decree and that the welfare of the child demanded modification.
Various alterations in circumstances have been deemed insufficient to warrant change.
See, e.g., Lock v. Lutz, 128 Il. App. 2d 476, 262 N.E.2d 256 (1970) (the fact that the
mother, to whom custody of a minor child had been granted, had been, subsequent to the
decree, guilty of adultery did not of itself represent such a change of circumstances as to
justify modification); Jayroe v. Jayroe, 58 Ill. App. 2d 79, 206 N.E.2d 266 (1965) (the fact
that mother gave birth to an illegitimate child was not enough, of itself, for changing
custody); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 86 Ill. App. 2d 224, 229 N.E.2d 144 (1967) (the fact
that custodial parent had recently remarried did not itself constitute sufficient cause to
justify modification).
45. See Comment, supra note 34, at 671. See also Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1972); Kirshner, Child Custody
Determination-A Better Way, 17 J. FAM. L. 275 (1979); Oster, Custody Proceeding: A
Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards,5 J. FAM. L. 21 (1965); Note, Measuring the
Child's Best Interests-A Study of Incomplete Considerations,44 DEN. L.J. 132 (1967).
46.

B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273 (1952).

47. Mnookin, supra note 27, at 229. See also MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE
(1978).
48. See Lauerman, NonmaritalSexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L. REV.
647, 674 (1977). See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNr, supra note 42. The authors
described their view of child placement by reference to a remark of Justice Wachenfeld:
"The uncertainties of life ...will always remain to be encountered as long as one lives.
•..Their devious forms and variations are too complicated and numerous to be susceptible of tabulation. Our inability to predict or solve them anchors us closely to nature's
intendment." Id. at 50. See also Note, Custody and the Cohabiting Parent,20 J. FAM. L.
697, 713 (1982).
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tive importance of those factors which affect the child.49 Furthermore, no psychological theory can predict the long-term
ramifications of placing a child in the custody of one parent versus the other. 50 The problems that plague the general law of custody become more pronounced when cohabitation by the custodial parent becomes a factor in the custody proceeding.
Cohabitationas a Factorin Custody Proceedings
At one time cohabitation was considered "deviant" behavior.5 1 This attitude reflected the common law interest in prevent-

ing the debasement and corruption of society's morals. 52 States
sought to simultaneously discourage cohabitation and preserve
the institution of marriage 53 through the enactment of criminal
statutes punishing cohabitation and fornication. 54 As cohabitation has increasingly come to be recognized as an alternative to

49. See Mnookin, supra note 27, at 258 n.161 (wherein the author delineates the various competing theories of human development: physiological, behavioral, psychoanalytical, child learning, and interpersonal).
50. Id. at 251.
51. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 276. See also Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: The
Enforcement of Morals, 415 CALIF. L. REV. 588 (1968). The notion that cohabitation was
deviant behavior was analogous to the common law treatment of lewdness as a misdemeanor.
52. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 313. See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 111. 2d at 346, 400
N.E.2d at 424 ("Conduct of that nature, when it is open, not only violates the statutorily
expressed moral standards of the State, but also encourages others to violate those
standards, and debases public morality.").
53. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979) (emphasized the refusal of
the General Assembly in enacting the IMDMA to sanction any nonmarital relationships
and its declaration of the purpose to strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage
and safeguard family relationships). This right of the state to regulate the institution of
marriage was rec3gnized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877), in which it stated that "[t]he state.. .has the absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the
causes for which it may be dissolved." Id. at 734-35. See generally Note, Fornication,
Cohabitationand the Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REV 252 (1978).
54. In Illinois, 11-8 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that "[a]ny person who
cohabits or has sexual intercourse with another not his spouse commits fornication if the
behavior is open and notorious." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.38, 11-8 (1977). In Jarrett v. Jarrett,
78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1067
(1980), the court found the mother's conduct to be "open and notorious." The evidence
supporting this finding included the fact that the mother discussed her behavior with her
children, her ex-husband, and her neighbors. Id. at 346.
Twenty other states and the District of Columbia have statutes which proscribe cohabitation or fornication. See ALA. CODE § 8-1 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1409 (1983);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1002 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 789.01 (West 1976); GA. CODE § 262010 (1977); IDAHO CODE § 18-6604 (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 16 (West
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marriage 55 or as a premarital step, however, most states have
begun to either repeal their cohabitation statutes or not enforce
56
them.
The issue of cohabitation is usually raised upon petition for
modification, although the nonmarital sexual conduct of a parent is relevant in initial custody proceedings as well as in subsequent modifications. 57 The party seeking modification of the
initial custody order usually alleges that the cohabitation by the
custodial parent seriously endangers the child's emotional, mental, moral, or physical health.58 Judicial response to the allegation that cohabitation by the custodial parent is incongruous

1984); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.335 (1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-10-2 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-8 (1976);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-3 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-104 (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-345 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-4 (1980); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 944.15 (West 1978).
55. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 318-28. In that article, the author takes an in-depth
look at the historical alternatives to formal marriage. The two main alternatives discussed are compassionate marriage and common law marriage. Compassionate marriages were formal legal marriages with state controlled consequences. "The parties
entered into the relationship with the expectation that it would be permanent, however,
there existed a safety valve of divorce by mutual consent if the parties remained childless
and, after separation, reconciliation efforts were unsuccessful." Id. at 319. Common law
marriages carried greater legal consequences yet were not strapped with the formalities
of legal marriage. The elements of common law marriage include present agreement,
cohabitation, acknowledgement, and repute. Id. at 321 n.187. See also LINDSEY & EVANS,
THE COMPASSIONATE MARRIAGE 132 (1927); Note, Common Law Marriageand Unmarried
Cohabitation:An Old Solution to a New Problem, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 579 (1978).
56. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 287-308. The article examines how legislators, prosecutors, and judges have responded to the increasing incidence of cohabitation in Wisconsin. The author conducted a study concerning the enforcement of the criminal statute
against cohabitation. Response to a survey of 50 district attorneys revealed that 23 of the
district attorneys never received a request from anyone to prosecute cohabitation and 25
of the attorneys who responded, had received requests, but had chosen not to prosecute.
Id. at 288 n.57.
The continued acceptance of cohabitation is further reflected in the increased numbers
of books and articles on the subject. See, e.g., G. DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND
THE LAw (1979); L. ENGLEBARDT II, LIVING TOGETHER, WHAT'S THE LAw: (1981); R. GALLEN,
J. KAPLAN & J. BIANCO, THE UNMARRIED CoUPLE'S LEGAL HANDBOOK (1981); S. KATz & M.
INKER, FATHERS, HUSBANDS, AND LOVERS-LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1979). See
also Wadlington, Sexual Relations After Separation or Divorce: the New Morality and
the Old and New Divorce Laws, 63 VA. L. REV. 249 (1977); Note, In re Cary: A Judicial
Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation,25 HASTINGS L.J. 226 (1974).
57. Although the issue of cohabitation does not usually arise at the initial custody
proceeding, the courts do consider the parents' sexual conduct in determining which parent will best serve the child's interests. See, e.g., Patterson v. Patterson, 47 Ill. App. 2d
133, 197 N.E.2d 724 (1964) (evidence of mother's course of adulterous conduct with married men sustained court's award of custody to father).
58. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40, 610(b)(3) (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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with the child's best interest has been mixed. 59
The conflicting attitudes regarding whether cohabitation is
detrimental to the child's welfare are reflected in the legal system's inconsistent treatment of the issue. Illinois courts have
treated the issue in four ways: 60 cohabitation giving rise to a
conclusive presumption of unfitness; cohabitation as merely one
factor to be considered in the totality of evidence; cohabitation as
"tipping the balance" when all other factors are equal; and
cohabitation giving rise to a rebuttable presumption. The most
controversial approach, the conclusive presumption approach, is
61
represented by the seminal Illinois case of Jarrettv. Jarrett.
DISCUSSION

Jarrettv. Jarrett
The Facts of the Case
In December 1976, Jacqueline Jarrett received a divorce from
her husband Walter 62 and was awarded custody of the three
Jarrett children, ages twelve, ten, and seven.6 3 In May 1977,
Jacqueline informed Walter that her boyfriend would be moving
into the home with her and the children. 64 Walter objected and
filed a petition to modify custody on the grounds that Jacqueline's
living arrangements were not providing a proper environment in
which to raise their children. 65

59. See infra text accompanying notes 106-38.
60. Lauerman, supranote 48. The author of this article discusses four approaches that
the courts have adopted in dealing with nonmarital sexual conduct, which may or may
not include cohabitation: conclusive disqualification, presumptive unfitness, direct adverse

impact, and presumptive adverse impact. See Note, Child Custody: ParentalCohabitational Relationships and the Best Interests of the Child Standard-Jarrettv. Jarrett,29
DE PAUL L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1980). See generally Bregman, Custody Awards: Standards
Used When the Mother Has Been Guilty of Adultery or Alcoholism, 2 FAM. L.Q. 384
(1968); Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423 (1964).

61.

78 Ill. 2d 37, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927, reh'g denied, 449

U.S. 1067 (1980).

62. Id. at 340, 400 N.E.2d at 421. Jacqueline received a divorce from Walter in the
Circuit Court of Cook County on grounds of extreme and repeated mental cruelty.
63. Id. at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 422. In addition to custody of the children, the divorce
decree awarded Jacqueline the use of the family home and child support. Walter received
reasonable visitation rights.
64.
65.

Id.
Walter based his petition on ILL REV. STAT. ch 40,

610(b)(3) (1981). See supra
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Following a hearing at which Jacqueline and Walter testified, 66
the circuit court modified the original decree and transferred custody to Walter. The court held that modification was "necessary
for the moral and spiritual well-being and development" of the
children.6 7 The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, reasoning that
the circuit court record did not reveal any negative effects on
the children caused by Jacqueline's cohabitation and that the
68
circuit court had not found Jacqueline unfit.
The Illinois Supreme Court formulated the issue as "[w]hether a
change of custody predicated upon the open and continuous
cohabitation of the custodial parent with a member of the opposite sex is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence in the
absence of any tangible evidence of contemporaneous adverse
effect upon the minor children." 69 A divided Illinois Supreme
Court held that Jacqueline's cohabitation warranted a change in
custody.7 0 Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate court's
decision and reinstated the circuit court's modified custody
71
decree.
The Majority Opinion
The Jarrettcourt relied upon the state's fornication statute72 and
the IMDMA7 3 as indicia of the relevant standards of conduct.
These statutes, the court noted, were enacted not to sanction
nonmarital relationships but to "strengthen and preserve the
integrity of marriage and safeguard the family relationship."7 4

note 39 for the text of this provision. Technically, the new Illinois Marriage Act 610
was not applicable to the Jarrettcase because the appeal from the custody modification
was taken before the effective date of the Act. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, ex-

amained the prior case law and decided that the outcome of the case would not be
affected by the applicability or non-applicability of the IMDMA. 78 Ill. 2d at 343-44, 400
N.E.2d at 423.
66. 78 Ill. 2d at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 423.
67. Id.
68. 64 Ill. App. 3d 932, 937, 382 N.E.2d 12, 16-17 (1978). The appellate court declined to
consider potential future effects of the cohabitation on the children.
69. 78 111. 2d at 345, 400 N.E.2d at 423.
70. Id. at 350, 400 N.E.2d at 426.
71.

Id.

72. IL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 11-8 (1981). See supranote 54 for the text of this statute.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 610 (1981). See supra note 39. The principal cases upon
which the Jarrettcourt relied included Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204
(1979); Gehn v. Gehn, 51 Ill. App. 3d 946, 367 N.E.2d 508 (1977); Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408,
105 N.E.2d 300 (1952).
74. 78 Ill. 2d at 345, 400 N.E.2d at 424. See supra note 53.
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Despite Census Bureau statistics which revealed changes in
family living arrangements, 75 the court found that Jacqueline's
open and notorious sexual conduct was an affront to the moral
standards of the state, as expressed by the legislature. 76 The court
observed that such flagrant violation of moral standards would
encourage others to engage in similar behavior. Moreover,
Jacqueline's lifestyle would instruct and encourage her children
77
to engage in similar conduct in the future.
Jacqueline argued that the modification provision of the
IMDMA, section 610(b), precluded the trial court from modifying
a prior custody award unless it found that the children had suf79
fered actual tangible harm.7 The court rejected this argument.
In the court's view, cohabitation had the potential to affect the
mental, moral, and emotional health of the children.80 Although
the court agreed that the children presently appeared unaffected
by the cohabitation, it declined to wait until the children began
emulating their mother's conduct before transferring custody to
81
the father.

75. See supra notes 1-3.
76. 78 Ill. 2d at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 425. But see Burris v. Burris, 70111. App. 3d 503, 388
N.E.2d 811 (1979) (the court recognized the increasing frequency of unmarried couples
living together as motivated by economic factors as well as personal reasons and commented that courts should deal realistically and fairly with the problems of daily life). See
supranote 54.
77. 78 Ill. 2d at 347, 400 N.E.2d at 425. See also Hahn v. Hahn, 69 Ill. App. 2d 302, 216
N.E.2d 229 (1966) (court transferred custody to father because mother was living in open adultery with married man and such action shows disdain for the generally accepted standards of morality).
78. 78 Ill. 2d at 348, 400 N.E.2d at 425. See supra note 52. Other Illinois courts have
refused to modify or to award custody based on the conduct of the present or proposed
custodial parent that was not shown to have detrimentally affected the child. See, e.g.,
Soldner v. Soldner, 69 Ill. App. 3d 97, 386 N.E.2d 1153 (1979) (mother's sexual activity not
determinative of her right to custody in the absence of proof that it had detrimental effect

on the children). See also Eaton v. Eaton, 50 Ill. App. 3d 306, 365 N.E.2d 647 (1977); Fears
v. Fears, 5 Ill. App. 3d 610, 283 N.E.2d 709 (1972).
79. 78 Ill. 2d at 348, 400 N.E.2d at 425.
80. Id. at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 425. The majority was also concerned that if the Jarrett
children remained in their present environment that they might be compelled to try to
explain their mother's paramour's presence to their friends and perhaps to endure taunts
and jibes.
81. Id. See also In re Marriage of Padiak, 101 Ill. App. 3d 306, 427 N.E. 2d 1372 (1981).
The IMDMA does not require that there be actual harm to the physical, mental, moral or
emotional health of the child before change of custody can be awarded; rather, the Act
contemplates potential harm as well as present harm. But see Ehr v. Ehr, 77 Ill. App. 3d
540, 396 N.E.2d 87 (1979) (sexual activity and marijuana use alone are not determinative
of a mother's right to continued custody absent proof that such conduct had detrimental
effect on the child).
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The Dissenting Opinions
82
Chief Justice Goldenhursh and Justice Moran dissented.
Justice Goldenhursh viewed the decision as establishing a per se
rule that cohabitation by the custodial parent mandates transfer
of custody.8 3 He questioned whether the increase in cohabitation
was attributable to parental example. In addition, he cautioned
the court not to address the issue of cohabitation with reference to
84
its own biases and preferences for traditional lifestyles.
Justice Moran read the opinion as "countenancing a change of
custody based solely on a conclusive presumption." 85 He did not
find one scintilla of actual or statistical evidence of harm or
danger to the children. 86 Therefore, he felt that the majority had
used the child custody issue to punish Jacqueline for her violation of the fornication statute rather than focusing on the best
87
interests of the children.

The United States Supreme Court's Denial of Certiorari
Jacqueline Jarrett's petition for writ of certiorari was denied, 8
with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissenting.8 9
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, expressed
concern that the decision raised the significant question of
"[w]hether the State may deprive a divorced mother of the custody of her children through the operation of a conclusive presumption that her cohabitation with an unmarried adult male

82. 78 Ill.
2d at 350, 400 N.E.2d at 426 (1979) (Goldenhursh, C.J., dissenting); Id. at
352, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 351,400 N.E.2d at 426. (Goldenhursh, C.J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 351, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Goldenhursh, C.J., dissenting). See Jingling v.
Trtanj, 99 Ill. App. 2d 64, 241 N.E.2d 39 (1968) (court warned that consideration of the
parent's misconduct in custody suits, in effect, punishes the parent and contravenes the
best interests standard).
85. 78 Ill. 2d at 352, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting). Justice Moran recently
reiterated his belief that Jarrettestablished a per se rule in In re Thompson, 96 Ill. 2d 80,
449 N.E.2d 93 (1983) (Moran, J., concurring). For purposes of this note, the terms "per se
rule" and "conclusive presumption" have been used interchangeably. For a discussion of
presumptions, see G. LALLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 40-60 (1978).

86. 78 Ill. 2d at 352, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Moran, J., dissenting). See also Jayroe v. Jayroe, 58 Ill. App. 2d 79, 206
266 (1965) (court refused to modify custody because to do so would only have
punishment for the mother's past misconduct).
88. 449 U.S. 927, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
89. Justice Blackmun dissented from the denial of certiorari and would have
case for argument; however, he did not write a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).

N.E.2d
been a

set the
at 931
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constitutes custody not in the best interest of the child, however
strong the contrary evidence." 90
Justice Brennan explained that the Jarrettdecision, in effect,
held that a violation of the Illinois fornication statute presumptively harmed the children. 91 The application of a conclusive
presumption, he noted, contravenes the recent Supreme Court
case of Stanley v. Illinois,92 which held unconstitutional the
conclusive presumption that an unwed father is unfit to exercise
custody over his children. 93 Brennan argued that based on
Stanley, the use of a conclusive presumption in Jarrettmay have
violated Jacqueline Jarrett's fourteenth amendment right to a
full and fair hearing on the issue of parental fitness. 94
Jarrett's Conclusive Presumption
Application of a presumption of unfitness is predicated on the
view that cohabitation is inconsistent with the child's best interests. 95 It is further based upon the speculation that cohabitation
by the custodial parent is detrimental to the child. 96 Proponents
of this approach contend that it is impossible for the cohabiting
parent to provide a healthy moral environment. 97 Based on sim90. Id. at 927 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 930 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
93. In Stanley, the plaintiff had fathered three illegitimate children and lived with the
mother intermittently. Upon the death of the mother, the children became wards of the
state pursuant to a statute which authorized such action. This action was taken without
a hearing on the grounds that there was no surviving parent. The existing state neglect
statute authorized the state to deprive a surviving parent of custody if it was found, upon
hearing, that the parent had not provided suitable care. Illinois argued that a father of

illegitimate children was not a "parent" within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it conslusively presumed that
unmarried fathers were incapable of caring for their children.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Jarrettsought to distinguish Stanley by noting that in
Stanley the father did not have a hearing as to fitness whereas Jacqueline Jarrett was
afforded such a hearing. It is debatable, however, whether a custody proceeding that only
considers the custodian's sexual conduct is, in reality, a hearing at all. See 449 U.S. at 929
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Jarrett,78 Ill. 2d at 353, 400 N.E. 2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting). Cf. Note, Modificationof Child Custody Predicatedon Cohabitationof the Custodial
Parent:Jarrettv. Jarrett,1981 B.Y.U. L Rev. 169.
94. 449 U.S. at 930 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Note, supra note 60, at 1144.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Gehn v. Gehn, 51 Ill. App. 3d 946, 367 N.E.2d 508 (1977) (custody transferred because the mother was not providing the children with proper moral training);
Hahn v. Hahn, 69 Ill. App. 2d 302, 216 N.E. 2d 229 (1966) (mother's cohabitation was not
conducive to the proper moral training of the children); Kline v. Kline, 57 Ill. App. 2d 244,
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ilar concerns, the Jarrettcourt held that Jacqueline's cohabitation would adversely affect her children's mental and emotional health
and therefore warranted a change of custody.
The scope and import of the Jarrett decision has been vigorously debated.98 Most commentators are in accord with the view
of Justices Brennan and Marshall that the Jarrett decision
implicitly establishes a conclusive presumption.9 9 Subsequent
Illinois appellate decisions that have addressed the issue of
whether Jarrettestablishes a per se rule have reached conflicting
conclusions.100 Furthermore, the justices of the Illinois Supreme
Court continue to debate the scope and effect of the Jarrett decision. 10 1 Although the case has generated discordant interpretations, the clear weight of authority supports the conclusion that
Jarrettimplicitly establishes a conclusive presumption that co10 2
habitation by the custodial parent warrants modification.
This conclusion is based on the majority's failure to adequately

205 N.E.2d 775 (1965) (although the mother had married her paramour the court transferred custody to the father because it was improbable that the mother could provide a
climate for the wholesome physical, mental, emotional, and moral growth of the children).
98. Minton & Golden, Two Attorney's Debate the Jarrettv. JarrettDecision: Should a
Divorced Mother Lose Custody Because She Has Lover?, 3 FAM. ADVOC. 18 (1981). Most
commentators agree that Jarrett implicitly establishes a per se rule that cohabitation by

the custodial parent mandates a modification of custody. See Minton, Jarrett v. Jarrett:
The Custody Crossroads,70 ILi B.J. 428 (1982); Note, Custody and the CohabitingParent, 20 J. FAM. L. 697 (1982); Child Custody Provisions, supra note 34; Modifying Child
Custody Awards, supra note 31. But see Note, supra note 93, at 169 (contends that the
Jarrettrationale is flawless and the use of presumptions in child custody cases is needed
to achieve the state's interest in protecting the child).
99. See supra note 98.
100. Compare Brandt v. Brandt, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 425 N.E. 2d 1251 (1981) (open
cohabitation with member of opposite sex does not mandate a change of custody) with In
re Marriage of Burgham, 86 Ill. App. 3d 341, 408 N.E. 2d 37 (1980) (case remanded to trial
court to determine whether the cohabitation has terminated and to enter judgment
according to Jarrett).
101. In re Marriage of Thompson, 96 Ill. 2d 67, 449 N.E. 2d 88 (1983), cert. denied, 52
U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1983) (No. 83-281). In Thompson, an original custody decision awarded the custody of the Thompson child to a father who was cohabiting. The
mother argued that Jarrettrequired custody to be awarded to the non-cohabiting parent.
In an opinion that is in direct conflict with the reasoning expounded by the court in
Jarrett,the Illinois Supreme Court held that "Jarrettdoes not establish a conclusive presumption.. [that] because a custodial parent cohabits with a member of the opposite sex,
the child is harmed." Id. at 78, 449 N.E.2d at 93. Justice Moran concurred with the judgment yet did not concur with the majority's statement of the Jarrettholding. In his
opinion, Jarrettdid establish a conclusive presumption. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at
352-53, 400 N.E. 2d at 427 (1979) (Moran, J., dissenting).
102. See supra notes 7 & 98.
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consider the trial court record and its blanket application of the
03
Illinois fornication statute.
The formulation of the issue by the Jarrett court implies that
evidence of Jacqueline's fitness or unfitness was not considered.
As the court noted, the issue was whether or not the trial court
abused its discretion by modifying custody absent any tangible
0 4
evidence of contemporaneous adverse effect on the children.'
The trial record clearly revealed that the children were well-cared
for and well-adjusted. Yet the court ignored this evidence and
instead considered only the existence of a cohabitational relationship.
The court also evaluated the existence of cohabitation in view
of the Illinois fornication statute. Whether the children were
affected by the conduct was apparently irrelevant. The court
assumed that because Jacqueline violated the fornication statute
her actions would adversely affect the children's well-being. As a
result, even though Jacqueline was provided a hearing on the
issue of parental fitness, 10 5 the court's failure to consider the
trial record and its blanket application of the fornication statute
established a conclusive presumption and effectively denied
Jacqueline Jarrett a full and meaningful hearing. At a minimum, the decision fashions a very rigid standard, a standard
which the Illinois Appellate Court has declined to support.
Post-JarrettJudicialTreatment of
ParentalCohabitation
The Illinois Appellate Court has apparently been reluctant to
apply Jarrett as broadly as it was written.10 6 This reticence is

103. See Minton, supra note 98, at 431.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 69-81.
105. Although the Jarrettmajority sought to distinguish its decision from Stanley v.
Illinois, Justice Moran, in his dissent, recognized that the majority's disposition of the
case was the equivalent of no hearing at all. 78 Ill. 2d at 353, 400 N.E.2d at 426 (Moran,
J., dissenting).
106. See Minton, supra note 98, at 430. See, e.g., In re Blonsky, 84 Ill. App. 3d 810, 405
N.E.2d 1112 (1980). In Blonsky, the parents were awarded joint custody of their minor
child. Mr. Blonsky, who lived in California, began cohabiting with an unmarried woman.
Mrs. Blonsky petitioned the court for modification of the custody decree based on the
father's relationship. The Blonsky court, in an attempt to avoid the holding of Jarrett,
distinguished its facts in two ways. First, unlike Mr. Jarrett's testimony, Mrs. Blonsky
did not specifically testify that she objected to the cohabitational relationship. Second,
the Blonsky court noted that, unlike the Illinois statute relied upon in Jarrett,there was
no similar statute against cohabitation in California. Id. at 819, 405 N.E.2d at 1118.
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not a rejection of the Jarrettview that cohabitation may be detrimental to the child's welfare,1 0 7 but rather a rejection of the
rationale employed by the Jarrettcourt. In subsequent decisions,
the appellate court has disagreed with Jarrett's refusal to consider all the circumstances present in the child's environment,
the refusal to recognize documented shifts in the family structhe disreture, the implicit use of a conclusive presumption, and
10 8
gard of the well-established best interests standard.
Only one Illinois appellate decision thus far has mechanically
followed the Jarrettholding. In In re Custody of Iverson, 109 temporary custody of the Iverson child was transferred from the
mother to the father. The sole basis for the modification was a
verified allegation by the father that the child was being exposed
to Mrs. Iverson's "live-in boyfriend." 110 Citing Jarrettand referring to the petitioner's verified allegation, the appellate court
acknowledged that "[the existence of such an environment would
be sufficient grounds to justify a change in custody under section
610."111

Iverson clearly represents the minority position. In the majority of cases, the appellate court has developed various methods
for resolving the issue of custody and cohabitation. Generally
the cases can be classified under one of three approaches: cohabitation giving rise to a rebuttable presumption, cohabitation tipping the balance, or considering cohabitation within the totality
of the evidence.
Cohabitation Gives Rise to a Rebuttable Presumption of
Unfitness
Under the rebuttable presumption approach, the cohabiting
parent may rebut the presumption of unfitness by presenting
evidence showing that there has been a reform in the nonmarital
sexual conduct at issue. This approach is based upon precedent
which allows the cohabiting parent to maintain custody "if the
parent's present conduct establishes the improbability of such

107.
108.
note 7.
109.
110.
111.

See Note, supra note 60, at 1144.
See, e.g., Brandt v. Brandt, 99 Il. App. 3d 1089, 425 N.E.2d 1251 (1981). See supra
83 Ill.
App. 3d 493, 404 N.E.2d 411 (1980).
Id. at 496, 404 N.E.2d at 414.
Id. at 497, 404 N.E.2d at 415.
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lapses [in moral conduct] in the future." 112 To demonstrate that
future lapses in moral conduct are improbable, the cohabiting
parent must have married, terminated the relationship, or established future plans to marry. 113 The Illinois Appellate Court, in
fact, has often used eleventh hour marriages or terminations of
relationships to avoid the Jarrettholding and allow the cohabit14
ing parent to maintain custody.1
In the case of In re Custody of Nodot," 5 the custodial mother
petitioned the trial court for permission to remove her two year
old daughter from the country. This proposed move was necessary in order to allow the mother to go with her new husband to
his job in Indonesia.116 The father, who was cohabiting with an
unmarried woman at the time, counter-petitioned for custody.
The trial court disregarded the father's present cohabitation and
awarded him custody because the father had represented to the
court his intention to marry his paramour." 7 In addition, the

112. Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952). In Nye, the Illinois Supreme Court
noted that the presumption of unfitness based upon the cohabitation of a custodial parent could be overcome by showing that the misconduct had terminated and would not
resume in the future.
113. See, e.g., In re Custody of Saloga, 96 Ill. App. 3d 661, 421 N.E. 2d 991 (1981) (court
refused to modify custody even though the mother had been cohabiting because she had
terminated that relationship before the modification proceedings were brought and she
had since married).
It should be noted that either marriage or termination of the relationship will rebut the
presumption, even if these measures are taken at the eleventh hour. See, e.g., In re Custody of Boyer, 83 Ill. App. 3d 52, 403 N.E.2d 796 (1980) (court denied father's petition to
modify custody based upon mother's cohabitation because immediately upon the filing of
the petition, the mother ended the relationship so as to not do anything that would
endanger the child's welfare and child was too young to be aware of her mother's moral
indiscretions).
114. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hanson, 112 Ill. App. 3d 564, 445 N.E.2d 912 (1983)
(custody maintained in father who was cohabiting because he testified he had plans to
marry his girlfriend); In re Marriage of Burgham, 86 111. App. 3d 341, 408 N.E.2d 37 (1980)
(case remanded for determination of whether the improper cohabitation had discontinued, and, if it had, then past cohabitation would not disqualify cohabiting parent from
custody). See Minton, supra note 98, at 430.
115. 81 Ill. App. 3d 883, 401 N.E.2d 1189 (1980). See also Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Il. App.
3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (1978). In Rippon, the mother testified that she and her live-inboyfriend were going to be married as soon as her second divorce was final. Id. at 466,
381 N.E.2d at 73. In maintaining custody in the cohabiting mother, the court noted that
past moral indiscretions alone are not grounds for a change in custody when the children
appear to be leading normal lives. Id. at 468, 381 N.E.2d at 73. The court emphasized that
even open adulterous acts are not grounds for custody once the mother has married the
paramour. Id.
116. Nodot, 81 Ill. App. 3d at 886, 401 N.E.2d at 1191.
117. Id. at 889, 401 N.E.2d at 1193.
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court held that the two year old daughter was too young to be
118
aware of the father's relationship and its consequences.
On appeal, the Nodot court referred to Jarrett,stating that the
transfer of cust6dy in Jarrettwas the result of the existence of a
sexual relationship between unmarried persons. 119 Although the
court recognized that Jarrettmandated a change of custody, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court decision to award custody
to the cohabiting parent. Jarrettwas held inapplicable because,
unlike Jacqueline Jarrett, "the father had represented in his brief
and oral argument that he and his girlfriend have married, pur120
suant to his intention as expressed to the trial court."'
Cohabitation Tips the Balance When All Other Factors
Are Equal
Many commentators view Jarrett as establishing a per se rule
that cohabitation by the custodial parent warrants a modification of custody.1 21 In addition, the Jarrettholding has also been
described as "extremely narrow and only becom[ing] operative
1 22
as a 'tie-breaker' when all other custody factors are equal."
This interpretation of Jarrett is based on the language in the
opinion that custody should be transferred "to Walter Jarrett, an
equally caring and affectionate parent whose conduct did not
contravene the standards established by General Assembly and
1 23
earlier decisions."
This "tie-breaker" rationale was applied by the Illinois Appellate Court in In re Custody of Boyer.124 In this case, original custody had been awarded to Mrs. Boyer, who later began residing
with a man to whom she was not married. The father petitioned
the court for modification on the grounds that the mother's
cohabitation endangered the mental, emotional, and moral health
125
of the child.
118. See supranote 14.
119. 81 Ill.
App. 3d at 893, 401 N.E.2d at 1197.
120. Id. at 893, 400 N.E.2d at 1197. In distinguishing Jarrett, the Nodot court
explained how, unlike Mr. Nodot, Jacqueline Jarrett maintained at oral argument that
she was still cohabiting and had no intention of marrying her paramour.
121. See supra note 98.
122. See Minton & Golden, supra note 98, at 19 (Harvey L. Golden, chairman of the

ABA Family Law Section's Committee on Paternity, referred to the Jarrettdecision as a
"tie-breaker.").

123.
124.
125.

78 Ill.
2d at 350, 400 N.E.2d at 438 (emphasis added).
83 Ill. App. 3d 52, 403 N.E.2d 796(1980).
Id. at 53, 403 N.E.2d at 797. Mr. Boyer also alleged that the mother's paramour
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The Boyer court agreed with the Jarrett view of cohabitation
as creating a potentially dangerous emotional and moral climate
in which to raise children. 126 Nonetheless, the Boyer court did
not treat cohabitation as giving rise to a conclusive presumption
of unfitness. Instead, it held that "if all other factors are equal,
then cohabitation could tip the balance in favor of the petitioning parent." 127 After reviewing the facts before it, the Boyer
court concluded that all factors were not equal in this case and
therefore the scale need not tip in favor of the non-cohabiting
parent.1 28 Consequently, custody was maintained in Mrs. Boyer.
Cohabitation As One Factor in the Totality of the
Evidence
In some cases, the Illinois Appellate Court has treated cohabitation as merely one factor to be examined in relation to all other
existing factors that may affect the child's welfare. Utilization of
this approach eliminates the narrow focus on the morality of the
parental conduct and instead considers the emotional and physical environment of the child as well.1 29 Usually, a court following this approach will require the petitioning party to bring forth
evidence that cohabitation by the custodial parent has been det1 30
rimental to the child.

physically abused the child. Since the evidence was in dispute concerning this allegation,
the appellate court deferred to the trial court's judgment that the physical health of the
child was not endangered by the mother's cohabitation. Id. Evidence of physical punishment was the basis of the decision in Applegate v. Applegate, 80 Ill.
App. 3d 81, 399
N.E.2d 330 (1980). In Applegate, the mother's boyfriend frequently stayed overnight at
the home of the custodial mother. The father petitioned the court for modification of
custody based upon Jarrett.The Applegate court noted that it need not look to Jarrett
and consider the question of the children's moral health because there was enough evidence of tangible harm to the children. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial
court and placed custody of the children with the father.
126. 83 Ill. App. 3d at 55, 403 N.E.2d at 798.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 53, 403 N.E.2d at 798.
129. Accord Hagen v. Hagen, 226 N.W.2d 13 (Iowa 1975) (court refused to modify custody from the parent who had been cohabiting because the children were healthy, doing
well in school and otherwise normal); Feldman v. Feldman, 55 Mich. App. 147, 222
N.W.2d 2 (1974) (court emphasized that the custodial adulterous mother was a good
mother and the children were well-adjusted).
130. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hubbard, 315 N.W.2d 75 (Iowa 1982) (evidence showed
that mother had neglected children's education and medical treatment and engaged in
sexual intercourse with numerous men in the presence of children); In re Marriage of
McCreary, 276 N.W.2d 399 (Iowa 1979) (court modified custody upon finding that the
custodial mother's conduct was upsetting the children, that one of the mother's par-
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The totality approach was adopted by the Illinois Appellate
Court in Brandt v. Brandt.131 In this case, the mother had custody of her two youngest daughters, 132 ages fourteen and fifteen.
After the mother began living with a married man, the father
petitioned the court for modification of the original decree and
1 33
argued that Jarrettmandated a custody transfer.
Rather than applying Jarrett in an absolute manner, the
Brandt court interpreted Jarrett as requiring an individualized
evaluation and assessment of all the evidence.1 34 The Brandt
court's evaluation of the evidence revealed that the children were
in excellent physical and mental health and were doing well in
school.1 35 Although the older daughter preferred to remain with
the mother, the younger daughter preferred to live with her
father. As in Jarrett,no evidence of mental, moral, or physical
harm was present. 36 Contrary to the holding of Jarrett,however, the Brandt court affirmed the trial court decision to maintain custody of the older child in the cohabiting mother. Based
on the younger child's strong paternal preference, her custody
1 37
was transferred to the father.

amours had struck the child and struck the mother hard enough to leave marks which
the child later saw, and that the mother and paramour slept together in the presence of
the child); Black v. Black, 203 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 1972) (evidence revealed that the mother
had had an illegitimate child since her divorce and had left the child for five months with
a family of strangers and as a result of these experiences the child developed emotional
symptoms).
131. 99 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 425 N.E.2d 1251 (1981).
132. Id. at 1091, 425 N.E.2d at 1253.
133. Id. at 1092, 425 N.E.2d at 1254.
134. Id. at 1095, 425 N.E.2d at 1256. See also Soldner v. Soldner, 69 Ill. App. 3d 97, 386
N.E.2d 1153 (1979) (although the mother was engaging in sexual activities in her home,
this was not determinative of her right to continued custody, as there was no evidence
showing that she was unfit or that the home environment was unfavorable).
135. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 1105, 425 N.E.2d at 1265. Accord In re Marriage of Settle, 276
Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976) (custody modification denied on the grounds that the child
was happy, well-adjusted, and not suffering any ill effects as a result of the mother's
conduct).
136. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 1105, 425 N.E.2d at 1263. Cf. Moore v. Smith, 255 Ark. 249, 499
S.W.2d 634 (1973) (court noted that the mother's cohabitation with the paramour was
only one of a number of factors upon which the court modified custody; the evidence
showed that the child was afraid of the mother's paramour, the child preferred to live
with his father, the mother had several stormy marriages since her divorce from the
father, the mother swore and drank, the mother permitted her older son by a previous
marriage to conduct immoral love affairs in the home, and the mother physically abused
her son because of his preference to live with his father).
137. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 1107, 425 N.E.2d at 1264. See supranote 15.
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ANALYSIS
Rejection of the Conclusive PresumptionApproach
Although in the majority of cases, the Illinois Appellate Court
has sought to avoid Jarrett'sconclusive presumption approach,
no definitive rationale supporting the evasion of Jarretthas been
enunciated.'3 8 There are, however, three reasons why the Jarrett
approach should be rejected: first, the custodial parent's constitutional rights may be violated; second, the application of a conclusive presumption contravenes the IMDMA; and, third, there
is great potential for the misapplication of such a rigid standard
as the conclusive presumption approach.
Constitutional Reasons for Rejecting Jarrett
The Jarrett rationale is weakened by at least three constitutional infirmities. First, the implicit use of a conclusive presumption stands in opposition to Stanley v. Illinois.'39 Stanley 140 is
one case in a line of many recent United States Supreme Court
decisions striking down the use of conclusive presumptions. 141 In
Stanley, the Court declared unconstitutional the conclusive presumption that an unwed father is unfit to exercise custody over
his children. 142 As for the issue of custody and cohabitation, any
approach that modifies custody solely on one factor and disregards all others clearly trangresses the Stanley prohibition against
143
the use of conclusive presumptions.
A second constitutional reason for the rejection of Jarrett's

138. See supra text accompanying notes 106-37.
139. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
140. See generally Note, The Impact of Stanley v. Illinois on Custody Proceedingsfor
Illegitimate Children:ProceduralParity for the Putative Father?,3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 31 (1973).
141. Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975) (presumption
that a pregnant woman is incapable of working after the sixth month of pregnancy held
invalid); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974) (presumption that
any teacher who was past her fifth month of pregnancy is presumed unfit to teach held
invalid); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973) (conclusive presumption that anyone over 18 who was claimed as a dependant by a nonmember
taxpayer is not in need of food stamps held invalid); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446
(1973) (conclusive presumption that because legal address was outside the state at the
time of application to state university it remained out-of-state for the duration of the
school year). See generally Lauerman, supra note 48, at 681.
142. See supra notes 92 and 93.
143. Id.

362
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conclusive presumption approach is based upon the recognition
that there is a constitutional right to engage in consensual adult
heterosexual activity. 144 Although the United States Supreme
Court has not explicitly recognized such a right, many commentators argue that such a right may exist under the "penumbra of privacy." 145 Based upon a line of cases beginning with
1 47
Lochner v. New York 146 and Griswold v. Connecticut,
and
1 48
culminating with Roe v. Wade
and Carey v. Population Ser1 49
the Supreme Court has consistently mainvices International,
tained that the right to privacy includes "the freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life. ' 150 As the Jarrett

144. See generally Lauerman, supra note 48, at 681-708. See also Carey v. Population
Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Court noted that it "has not definitively answered the
difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes
regulating private consensual sexual behavior among adults." Id. at 681.
145. See Lauerman, supra note 48, at 691; Note, Fornication,Cohabitation,and the
Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REV. 253 (1978). See generally Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protectionfor PersonalLiberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670 (1973); Comment, Child Custody:
Best Interest of Children v. ConstitutionalRights of Parents,81 DICK. L. REV. 733 (1977).
146. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Although Lochner is not a sexual privacy case, the case is
significant because of its extension of judicial power in the area of substantive due process. In Lochner, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law limiting the working
hours of bakery employees because it interferred with right to contract. The court held
that their right to contract was part of the "liberty of the individual protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment .... Id. at 53. Lochner was highly criticized because of its
potentially limitless reach and its "natural justice" notions. See Grey, Origins of the
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
147. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the court held unconstitutional a law that prohibited married couples from using contraceptives because the law "swept unnecessarily
broadly." In declaring this law unconstitutional, the Court held that the right of privacy
protects the marriage relationship. The opinion, written by Justice Douglas, spoke of

"zones of privacy" within the penumbra of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth

amendments. Id. at 484. Although Griswold dealt with the narrow issue of contraception,
the opinion has been a basis for cases more generally concerned with the issues of sexual
conduct. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (a ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons is equally as impermissible as a ban on distribution to
married persons). See generally Note, Expanding the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 LoY. L.
REV. 1279 (1981).
148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the fundamental right to privacy protects a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy unless regulation of the abortion would further a compelling state interest).
149. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting
procreation extends to'minors as well as to adults, and since the state cannot impose a
blanket prohibition on the minor's choice to terminate her pregnancy, then a blanket
prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives is also foreclosed).
150. In Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (denying certiorari), Justice Marshall wrote: "Although we have never demarcated the precise boundaries of this right [to privacy], we have held that it broadly encompasses 'freedom of per-
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court noted, states have an interest in preserving the family 15 ' and promoting the morality of its citizens. 152 Even the
most ardent modern advocate of "the enforcement of morals,"
however, views the state interest in certain matters of individual
53
choice as limited.1
In conjuction with the "privacy" argument is the constitutional claim that modification of custody based on cohabitation
alone infringes an individual's freedom of association.' 54 If a
case is decided on the basis of the custodial parent's cohabitation
with members of the opposite sex, then, in effect, the judiciary is
exercising control over those persons with whom a divorced person can associate. A parent's decision to adopt a lifestyle not
accepted by all of society or to choose to associate with persons
with varying views of morality and philosophy should not be
55
infringed upon without some compelling state interest.1
Application of a Conclusive Presumption Contravenes
the IMDMA
Application of a conclusive presumption also contravenes the
language and purpose of section 602 of the IMDMA. 156 Section
602 expressly provides that the court consider all relevant factors
which may affect the child. 157 The employment of a conclusive
presumption automatically precludes any investigation into
whether or not the parental conduct has had an effect on the

sonal choice in matters of marriage and family life."' Id. at 736 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
151. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 344, 400 N.E.2d 421, 424 (1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 927, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
152. In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), Justice Harlan described the state's interest in promoting the morality in its citizens as a subject with which every society in
civilized times has found it necessary to deal. Id. at 545-46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
153. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 1-25 (1965).
154. U.S. Const. amend. I. See generally Goldberg, The Constitution: The Safeguard
of Our Freedoms, 2 U. HAWAII L. REV. 539 (1981).
155. See Comment, supra note 145, at 733.
156. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 602(b) (1981) provides that "the court shall not consider
conduct of the present or proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the
child." This subsection derives from § 402 of the UMDA. The Commissioners' Note to
§ 402 states the twofold purpose of this subsection: to eliminate the need for the parties
"to spy on each other" and to remove "irrelevant" evidence from judicial consideration.
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197 (1974) (Commissioners' Note).
See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 1 503(c), 504(b), 505 (1981), which prohibit reliance on
past marital misconduct in determining maintenance, child support, and property rights.
157. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 131-37.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

child, For example, the Jarrettcourt refused to consider the trial
court record, which revealed that the children were well-cared for
and unaffected by the mother's living arrangement. This inordinate emphasis on the custodial parent's cohabitation, rather
than application of the best interests standard, violates the "all
58
relevant factors" requirement of the IMDMA.
The use of a conclusive presumption in the case of a cohabiting custodial parent also contravenes the purpose of the IMDMA.
With the enactment of the IMDMA, the General Assembly sought
to limit the broad discretion of the trial judge in custody cases. 159
Section 602 was to accomplish this by prohibiting the consideration of conduct that had not affected the child.1 60 A conclusive
presumption approach has as its starting point, however, the
speculation that cohabitation may be detrimental to the child's
well-being. This reliance on speculation is incongruous with the
statutory mandate that only parental conduct which actually
affects the child is to be regarded as a factor in the custody
1
proceeding. 6
The Potential for Misapplication of a Conclusive Presumption
The conclusive presumption approach poses several hazards
because of the rigidity that characterizes it. Such rigidity can be
dangerous for custodial parents and their children, because any
trend in the law which places exclusive reliance on one factor
invites error. Jacqueline Jarrett lost custody of her children
because she violated the state's fornication statute. 62 Fornication is a Class B misdemeanor in Illinois.163 If the Jarrettdecision were taken to its extreme, any custodial parent guilty of a
Class B misdemeanor could face losing custody of the child. 64
Although this may be an unlikely occurrence, the potential for
the misapplication and unwarranted extension of Jarrettis

158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 602(a) (1981) ("The court shall consider all relevant factors ....").
159. See supra text accompanying notes 32-44.
160. See supra note 35.
161. See Note, supra note 60, at 1146, 1152.
162. 78 Ill. 2d at 345, 400 N.E.2d at 421.
163. A Class B misdemeanor in Illinois is an offense punishable by imprisonment for
not more than six months. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
1005-8-3(a)(2) (1981), or a fine not to
exceed $500. Id.
1005-9-1(a)(3) (1981).
164. See Child Custody Provisions,supra note 34, at 681. In his dissent, Justice Moran
expressed concern for a decision that was based upon "selective enforcement" of a
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clearly illustrated by the case of Krabel v. Krabel.165
In this case, Mrs. Krabel was originally awarded custody of
her two children. Soon thereafter, she became involved in what
the Krabel court labeled "an illicit liaison."'166 Unlike the custodial parent in Jarrett,Mrs. Krabel's boyfriend did not live in her
home.16 7 Relying on Jarrett,the trial judge allowed Mrs. Krabel
to maintain custody provided that she either marry her boyfriend or terminate the relationship. 68 At the time of the appeal,
however, Mrs. Krabel had done neither. Consequently, the appellate court remanded the case and held that if no reformation of
Mrs. Krabel's conduct had occurred, custody should be trans69
ferred to Mr. Krabel.
To require a custodial parent to "reform" her conduct, when
that conduct merely consists of having a non-cohabiting boyfriend, illustrates the potentially dangerous extensions of the
conclusive presumption approach. This potential is an especially
grave matter in an area of law where the courts are essentially
170
deciding how a child will be raised.
In addition to the potential for misapplication, the rigidity of
the conclusive presumption approach makes it difficult to apply
in those gray areas not susceptible to exactitude. For example,
what is the result when both parents are cohabiting or one parent is cohabiting and the non-cohabiting parent is a child-beater
or chronic alcoholic?' 7 ' Would it be safe to presume that the
"seldom-enforced" fornication statute. 78 Ill. 2d at 352-53, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan, in his dissent from the denial of certiorari,commented on
Illinois' poor enforcement record of the fornication statute and that in Jarrett,the fornication statute was not enforced. 449 U.S. at 930 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. 102 Ill.
App.3d 251, 429 N.E.2d 1105 (1981).
166. Id. at 251, 429 N.E.2d at 1105.
167. Id. at 252, 429 N.E.2d at 1106 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 253, 429 N.E.2d at 1106.
169. Id. at 253-54, 429 N.E.2d at 1106. Accord Yount v. Yount, 366 S.W.2d 744 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1963) (mother's misconduct consisted only of hugging and kissing a boyfriend, but
the court held that the children were not receiving proper care and were being exposed to
substantial immoral influences through this misconduct).
170. Another example of possible extensions of Jarrett is represented by the lower
court opinion in the case of In re Marriage of Lawver, 82 Ill. App. 3d 198, 402 N.E.2d 430
(1980) (appellate court reversed lower court's decision to limit the father's visitation right
to only two days per month because the father was cohabiting).
171. See, e.g., Burris v. Burris, 70 Ill. App. 3d 503, 388 N.E.2d 811 (1979). In Burris,the
custodial mother was living with her boyfriend and had no future plans of marriage. Mr.
Burris, however, had contracted a blinding eye disease which caused him to become disabled and dependent on social security benefits for financial support. The appellate court
maintained custody of the children in the cohabiting mother. It concluded that, although
Mrs. Burris's conduct was alleged to be immoral, a custody transfer to Mr. Burris under
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cohabiting parent is less fit for custody? Application of the conclusive presumption approach under such circumstances may
place the child in an environment detrimental to his or her wellbeing. It is only through an evaluation of all relevant factors
that a court can achieve the proper result.
Cohabitationand Custody under CurrentIllinois Law
As a result of the varied response to Jarrett,it is difficult to
predict with any degree of certainty the probable outcome of a
custody case in Illinois involving a cohabiting parent. The appellate response to Jarrettrepresents the entire spectrum of methods
to resolve the issue of cohabitation and illustrates a broad range
of societal and judicial attitudes. 72 The Illinois appellate decisions also represent an attempt to realign the Illinois approach
to cohabitation to a position that more closely corresponds to the
current societal trend. 173 Nevertheless, because of the conflicting
interpretations of Jarrett,lack of predictability in the law of custody modification plagues the Illinois courts.
Factors which have emerged from cases considering Jarrett
include whether: there is evidence showing physical or emotional
harm to the child; the child has expressed a preference for a particular parent; the custodial parent has plans to marry or has
terminated the relationship; and the child is too young to be
aware of the relationship. 174 If the child is being neglected 175 or
if the child has a strong parental preference 176 then the custodial
parent's cohabitation is not an issue. Under these circumstances,
the issue of cohabitation operates only as a means for the noncustodial parent to claim that custody should be modified. If the
child is being treated well 177 and either has no parental preference or is too young to express one, then the courts emphasize

these facts would not serve the welfare of the children. Id. at 508, 388 N.E.2d at 815. See
Note, supra note 60, at 1155.
172. See supranote 60 and accompanying text.
173. See supranote 7.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
175. See, e.g., Applegate v. Applegate, 80 Ill. App. 3d 81,399 N.E.2d 330(1980) (mother's boyfriend mistreated children).
176. See, e.g., Brandt v. Brandt, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 425 N.E.2d 1251 (1981) (an inchambers interview revealed the child's strong preference to live with father). See supra
note 27.
177. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Olson, 98 Ill. App. 3d 316, 424 N.E.2d 386 (1981) (child
was well-treated).
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whether the custodial parent has plans to marry or has terminated the relationship. 178 If marriage is likely to occur or has
occurred, or the paramour has moved out, the cohabitational
179
relationship will not be an overriding consideration.
In a given custody case, the result under any particular approach depends upon the court's focus on either the parent's
conduct or the child's welfare and the degree of importance
placed on cohabitation. Under the conclusive presumption approach, the court's focus is on parental conduct, and the determinative factor is whether the custodial parent is cohabiting.
Similarly, the "rebuttable presumption" and "tip the balance"
approaches consider the conduct of the parent, even though
cohabitation may not be the sole factor examined.
It is questionable how different the "tip the balance" approach
is from the application of a conclusive presumption. All other
factors being equal in a particular case, when a court declares
that cohabitation will tip the balance in favor of the noncohabiting party, it, in effect, places exclusive reliance upon the
presence or absence of cohabitation.18 0 As a result, this exclusive
reliance establishes the presumption that cohabitation adversely
affects the well-being of the child.
Emphasis upon the cohabitation of the custodial parent also
characterizes the rebuttable presumption approach. Under this
approach, the cohabiting custodial parent maintains custody if
the parent marries or terminates the relationship. Such a standard is, in effect, marriage by edict, and may itself be unconstitutional.' 8 ' To require a parent to marry in order to retain custody of a child forces the parent into a marriage which the
parties may not have chosen as an alternative absent judicial
intervention. Such a "forced marriage" could defeat the goal of
"stability and continuity" in the child's environment. 8 2 If the
parent marries only to satisfy the values of the court, there may
be an increased chance that the marriage will fail and a divorce

178. See, e.g., In re Custody of Boyer, 83 Ill. App. 3d 52, 403 N.E.2d 796 (1980) (custody
maintained in mother because the three and one-half year old daughter was too young to
formulate a preference and mother's boyfriend had moved out).
179. See, e.g., In re Custody of Nodot, 81 Ill. App. 3d 883, 401 N.E.2d 1189 (1980) (the
cohabitants had plans to marry which they later carried out).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
181. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights

of man' fundamental to our very existence and survival."). See Minton, supra note 98, at
431.
182. See supra notes 42-45.
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occur. As a result, the child for whom the court was seeking to
provide stability is the victim of still another disruption of the
family structure.
In contrast to the conclusive presumption, rebuttable presumption, and "tip the balance" approaches, a totality approach prohibits the placement of exclusive reliance upon any one factor.
This approach takes the position that although cohabitation is
an appropriate consideration in custody disputes, it should not
automatically give rise to a conclusive presumption of unfitness. 8 3 Instead, a totality approach focuses on the child and
those relevant factors that pertain to the child's well-being and
best interests.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Determination of what is in the best interests of a child is a
formidable task. 84 An absolute rule that would eliminate the
multitude of considerations that pervade a custody dispute may
at first look appealing in terms of judicial economy. Where a
child's future is at stake, however, this interest deserves a careful
8 5
and complete assessment of all the relevant circumstances.
The totality approach is best suited for custody determinations
involving cohabitation because it is a flexible standard which
recognizes that the effect of cohabitation on children cannot be
ascertained.
Two reasons account for the difficulty in determining the
effect of parental cohabitation on children. First, there are currently no psychological studies to ascertain what future effects
cohabitation may have on children. 186 Although many experts

183. Accord In re Marriage of Kramer, 297 N.W.2d 359 (Iowa 1980) (mother's cohabitation is a proper factor to consider in deciding whether custody modification is appropriate); Ahlman v. Ahlman, 201 Neb. 273, 267 N.W.2d 521 (1978) (sexual misconduct is a
factor that may be considered in determining what is in the best interests of the child).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 14-26.
186. Gehn v. Gehn, 51 Ill. App. 3d 946, 367 N.E.2d 508 (1977) (it is difficult to predict
what psychological effects or problems may later develop from a child's efforts to
overcome the disparity between his concepts of propriety and his parent's conduct). See
also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 42, at 49 (Predictions may be

erroneous because "[nlo one-and psychoanalysis creates no exception-can forecast just
what experiences, what events, what changes a child or for that matter his adult custodian, will actually encounter." Id. (footnote omitted).). See Note, supra note 48, at 713.
Studies of the future effects of cohabitation on children may also pose constitutional

questions as to the right of privacy of the child and parent. Litwack, Gerber & Fenster,
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agree that children do learn from their parents, 187 it is impossi-

ble to define with any certitude what factors cause children to
adopt certain moral and spiritual values. 88
The second problem with determining the effect of cohabitation is based upon the nature of the problem. Cohabitation is, for
many, a moral issue. As with any discussion of morals, there are
divergent viewpoints. Some courts see their duty as insuring that
a child is raised in a "good moral environment" and view cohabitation as detrimental to a child's well-being. 8 9 Others argue
that the issue is beyond the scope of the legal system and should
be left to theologians. 90 The totality approach recognizes the
moral nature of the issue and the difficulty in determining the
effect of cohabitation, thus prohibiting exclusive reliance on any
single factor. Instead, the totality approach allows for a flexible
and in-depth evaluation of all the factors that exist in the present and proposed environments. Moral atmosphere is an important consideration in custody cases, however, any approach
which ignores the physical, mental, emotional, and intellectual
environment may not achieve what is best for the child. A decision based on all these factors will more accurately reflect the
environment best suited for the child. The flexibility of the totality approach allows the court to make individualized decisions
based upon the facts of each case, rather than upon rigid
absolutes. 191

The ProperRole of Psychology in Child Custody Disputes, 18 J. FAM. L. 269 (1979).
187. Bandura & McDonald, Influence of Social Reinforcement and the Behavior of
Models in Shaping Children's Moral Judgments, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 274
(1963). See also B. SPOCK, BABY AND CHILD CARE (1976).
188. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, supra note 42. The authors emphasize
that child custody decisions must take into account the law's incapacity to make longrange predictions:
[Olur capacity to predict is limited. No one.. .can.. predict in detail how the
unfolding development of a child and his family will be reflected in the long run
in the child's personality and character formation. Thus the law will not act in
the child's best interests but merely add to the uncertainties if it tries to do the
impossible-guess the future ....
Id. at 51-52 (footnotes omitted).
189. See, e.g., Defranco v. Defranco, 67 Ill. App. 3d 760, 768, 384 N.E.2d 997(1979) (the
court has the obligation to protect the moral health of children). See also Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 22 Ill. App. 3d 479,317 N.E.2d 681 (trial court determination that
best interests of the child required a more traditional background did not constitute an
abuse of discretion). See also Note, supra note 48, at 714.
190. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 337,400 N.E.2d at 421 (Goldenhursh, J., dissenting).
191. See Note, supra note 48, at 700.
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In applying the totality approach the court must remember
that the decision whether to cohabit is an individual moral
determination. The function of the trial judge is to analyze the
evidence presented and to decide which parent will provide the
most suitable custodial home. 192 The judge's function is not to
pass judgment on the parent's sexual conduct. If the court relies
on its own moral values in deciding whether the cohabiting or
non-cohabiting parent should have custody, the decisions may
193
reflect the values of the judiciary rather than those of society.
Within the contours of the totality approach, cohabitation
should be given the same weight and consideration as any other
factor. It should not be the mere "fact" that cohabitation is present which is considered, but only the "effect" that this conduct
has on the child.1 94 Speculative impact should not be considered. 195 It would be unfair to both the parent and the child to
allow courts to make predictions about cohabitation which even
the experts cannot agree upon.1 96 Courts should critically scrutinize the environment provided by the cohabiting parent and
when the evidence shows a clear direct impact or harm to the
child as a result of the cohabitation, the custodial parent's
cohabitation should be evaluated with all other relevant factors.

CONCLUSION

The Illinois Supreme Court in Jarrett v. Jarrett established a
rigid standard that cohabitation by the custodial parent mandates a transfer of custody. The Illinois Appellate Courts has
recognized the potential hardship and unfairness this approach
may have on the parent and child. As a result, most appellate
decisions since Jarretthave focused upon the welfare of the child
rather than the conduct of the parent. These cases, however,
have not utilized a consistent standard for determining the significance that should attach to cohabitation in custody proceed-

192. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
193. See Note, supra note 48. See Burris v. Burris, 70 Ill. App. 3d 503, 388 N.E.2d 811
(1979) ("[W]e recognize that it would be.. .erroneous for us to rely on our standards of
morality in making this review." Id. at 509).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 157-59.
195. See Lauerman, supra note 48, at 673.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
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ings. An appropriate standard for the courts to employ when
faced with this issue is an approach that reviews all factors
present in the child's environment. A broad totality approach
would provide flexibility in an area of law that is characterized
by vagueness. The complexity of the family structure requires
that in child custody disputes the court be allowed to decide each
case upon its own facts. Although an assessment of the totality
of circumstances is more difficult than the application of a conclusive presumption, it is only by weighing and balancing all
factors that the child's best interests will be served.
MARY BETH CYZE

